Rethinking Legal Fees In Lean Times. Practical Tips for General Counsel Managing Litigation In An Economic Recession.

Steep declines in corporate revenue have shareholders and CFOs knocking at the doors of their company’s general counsel demanding drastic reductions in legal budgets. Despite the decline in revenue, litigation has not seen a similar recession. Fees and costs associated with major and systemic litigation continue to grow, and so do the pressures on in‑house counsel to manage and contain these expenses. Faced with mandatory 35% reductions in legal budgets, general counsel continue to search for ways to accomplish those reductions while still meeting the challenges of successfully handling big stakes litigation.

Ensuring that legal fees and costs bear some reasonable relation to the inherent risks and litigation objectives of the company is among the more difficult tasks which now confront general counsel. In the past, when cost may not have been a major factor, many clients continued to retain “blue chip” law firms and allow their retained counsel to employ “scorched earth” tactics and leave no stone unturned. 

Today, legal fee expense and associated litigation costs are a paramount issue and containment of those litigation expenses requires a strategic, focused and disciplined effort. Because of this, many of the mega law firms, whose hourly rates and litigation staffing practices have not been cost‑efficient, are seeing new litigation assignments go to medium‑sized law firms whose hourly rates and trial‑focused litigation practices are better tailored to the economic demands in the current financial pinch.

A recent article in the National Law Journal corroborates this. It indicates that many general counsel have reported that their legal budgets are being constrained and they have to be more judicious about which law firms they chose. Partners at big law firms, eager to hang on to cash‑strapped clients and attract more clients in this belt‑tightening environment, are jumping to smaller firms where they can lower their billing rates and encounter fewer conflicts of interest.

Continue Reading...

Clarification Whether A Party Is Required To FileA Proposed Judgment Together With A Memorandum Of Costs In A Voluntary Dismissal Scenario

In Fries v. Rite Aid Corp., 2009 DJDAR 5721 (April 24, 2009), the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District clarified an issue concerning the procedure for properly filing a memorandum of costs where a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action. The court analyzed whether a party who seeks costs after a voluntary dismissal, is required to file a proposed judgment in addition to the memorandum of costs. The court concluded that there was no legal requirement that the party file a proposed judgment in addition to the cost memorandum.  The court clarified a procedural issue that has been pending for some time. The importance of this question from an attorney fee standpoint is that when any California statute refers to the award of “costs and attorneys fees,” the fees may be recoverable as a component of the costs to be awarded. Attorneys’ fees allowable as costs may be fixed upon noticed motion, at the time a statement of decision is rendered and/or, as in this case, on a cost memorandum supported by affidavit, made concurrently with a claim for other costs.

In Fries plaintiff filed a complaint against Rite Aid but soon thereafter filed a request for voluntary dismissal of the action. On the day that the plaintiff dismissed the case, Rite Aid filed a memorandum of costs. The plaintiff moved to strike or tax the costs arguing that the memorandum contained procedural defects because the defendant failed to file a proposed judgment or an order of dismissal simultaneously with the cost memorandum. The trial court disagreed with the plaintiff noting that the defendant complied with California rule of court 3.1700.

Under California rule of court 3.1700 a prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of the mailing of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under CCP § 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. A memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the item of costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.

The question framed by the Court of Appeal was whether as the plaintiff maintained, that the defendant was also required to file a proposed judgment along with their memorandum of costs. The court concluded that California Rules of Court 3.1700 does not require a party to do so. The plaintiff relied on a passage in a frequently relied on California practice guide for the proposition that “a prevailing party who claims costs shall serve and file a memorandum of costs after service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal.” The appellate court disagreed noting that the language in the practice guide referred to involuntary rather than voluntary dismissal because of the reference to CCP § 664.5.

Counsel should be guided by the clarification when filing a memorandum of costs seeking to recover either costs, attorneys’ fees or both in a voluntary dismissal scenario.

Helpful Tips to Ensure Compliance With Billing Guidelines

A client should regularly review the bills of counsel to determine whether attorneys and other billers have complied with generally accepted billing practices and established billing guidelines. The regular review of bills often results in the identification of questions and possible deductions for invoice entries that fail to comply with guidelines or industry norms. Certain types of activity included in the bills, as well as the format of billing entries, can give rise to concerns. Categories of entries a client should review include: block billing, vague and ambiguous entries, administrative and clerical tasks, excessive conferencing and unnecessary travel.

The practice of pervasive “block billing,” also known as “bulk billing” or “aggregate billing,” has been discouraged by courts and prohibited by most billing guidelines. “Block billing” is the practice of lumping two or more tasks into a single billing entry. Time is not allocated between the tasks and a single total amount of time is stated for all tasks contained in the blocks. Where this billing style is utilized, the client may have difficulty in determining whether the time spent on each task was reasonable.

An attorney’s or paralegal’s time entries should also be recorded in sufficient detail so that the work performed is clearly described and precisely communicated in a meaningful way. Courts require such precision in evaluating the reasonableness of fees billed by counsel. Accordingly, clients often take an estimated percentage deduction for “vague” entries, where through no fault of its own, a client is unable to determine the nature and/or scope of services claimed. Entries such as “Work on documents” “Review documents” “Telephone conference” and “Research” should not be paid without more of an explanation. Where attorneys report various communications, it is appropriate to require the names of both parties involved and the subject of the exchange. Thus, a client is within its rights to question reporting “Call with Joe Smith” or “Meeting re: depositions.”

Billing by attorneys and paralegals for the performance of “clerical” or “secretarial” tasks is also inappropriate without prior approval. These activities are generally considered part of a law firm’s overhead expenses, which are factored into the firm’s hourly rates for professional services. Clerical activities are those that do not require legal acumen. Secretaries, file clerks, messengers and other nonprofessional staff can perform these tasks effectively. Similarly, computer-related charges should not appear on an invoice for legal services without prior approval from the client.

In addition, the client should review questionable staffing decisions that may result in unnecessary fees and costs. “Multiple attendance,” means attendance at events by several attorneys where one could reasonably get the job done. It may be appropriate to take deductions where a firm sends more than one partner to a routine motion hearing without prior approval. A related category is “unnecessary travel.” An attorney should not travel (at a client’s expense) if he or she could perform the same work via email, fax machine, and/or teleconferencing.

A close review of bills should also include the fronted costs and expenses for which the law firms seek reimbursement. At a minimum, attorneys should always provide backup documentation for the underlying invoices to support the costs they incur. As with attorneys’ fees, the test for evaluating disbursements is one of reasonableness. The expenditure must be necessary and the amount reasonable. General overhead expenses are not appropriate disbursements because the law firm should factor them into the attorneys’ hourly billing rates. 

A monthly bill review should also look at quality control items that might include unapproved billing rate increases, billing entries for incorrect matters, and math errors.  All of the foregoing are typically helpful in reducing client costs as well as increasing attorney accountability. Before starting the analysis however, the reviewer must determine the criteria to be utilized in analyzing the invoices and strive for consistency. We also recommend meeting with the law firm regularly to ensure the law firm billers understand the guidelines and the client’s expectations. The most favorable result is always to educate the parties and to foster a trusting, transparent relationship between the attorney and client.

The Basics for Preparing a Petition Seeking Attorneys' Fees

Several issues should be considered by counsel prior to beginning the task of drafting a petition seeking an award of attorneys’ fees. Obviously, the applicant must be entitled to a fee award. Most frequently, entitlement to an award arises under a contract, a statute or case law granting the right to attorneys’ fees. Regardless of the authority for an award, it is critical for the applicant to understand that the burden of proof will lie with the petitioner in establishing the amount, necessity and reasonableness of the fees incurred. Under the Supreme Court authority of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) the fee claimant has the burden of proving that the fees requested were both reasonable and necessarily incurred.

The fee petition is typically set up via a written motion. The motion should set forth the legal and factual basis for the award, including declarations establishing the foundational facts supporting the claim.

A successful fee petition is based on in part on a determination that the fees sought are reasonable. This is frequently referred to as the lodestar. The lodestar is described as the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides the foundation for establishing the reasonableness of the lawyer’s services. The applicant must be aware that various factors will justify moving the award up or down depending on the success achieved and the capability of counsel handling the case. Particular attention should also be paid to the rates sought and whether they are in compliance for the type of case in the relevant community. 

The declarations submitted in support of the fee award will be scrutinized by the court and opposing counsel, particularly where numerous lawyers and paralegals participated in the case. In some cases it may also be prudent to retain an expert to provide testimony via declaration supporting the application. Where a fee request is not significant, retaining an expert may be hard to justify from an economic standpoint. However, where the fees are substantial an expert is particularly necessary to justify the award, particularly if the underlying record is not well developed.

Counsel should also expect that opposing counsel will retain their own expert to scrutinize the fee petition and the supporting declarations. Extra care should be made to establish, in the first instance, that the fees were necessary and reasonable. 

As a starting point to the entire process, it is fundamental that all of the billers keep accurate and contemporaneous time records of the fees incurred. In our experience, courts will either disallow or substantially reduce the fees sought where adequate and contemporaneous time records have not been maintained. The bills should demonstrate that time was recorded in specific detail, describing the work performed and tasks accomplished usually in one tenth of an hour increments.

The fee applicant should also keep in mind that a significant application for fees can often lead to a totally new round of litigation including writing discovery and depositions. The cost and potential recovery associated with the petition must be considered at the outset. 

A successful fee application begins at the outset of the representation. The manner in which time is recorded and the format and style of the bills will play a significant role in the outcome of the petition. It is extremely important that accurate and meaningful time entries be entered on a contemporaneous basis from the beginning to end of the litigation. This greatly enhances the possibility of obtaining a successful result.

Hourly Rate In Engagement Letter Held Not To Be Ambiguous

A client hired an attorney to represent him in a case.  The client signed an engagement letter to pay the attorney $200.00 per hour and further agreed to hourly billing rates for the attorney's staff.  The attorney and client negotiated a $10,000 retainer, later reduced the retainer, by agreement, to $5,000.   At the case's conclusion, attorney billed client for $35,304 after crediting the client the $5,000 retainer paid.   Client paid only $5,000 on the outstanding balance.

After failing to collect all of his fees, the attorney sued the client for nonpayment.  The client argued that because the written contract did not explicitly state whether the parties had agreed to an open account or a flat, maximum fee, the contract was ambiguous and therefore, a fact issue existed regarding the contract terms.  The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the attorney, but a Texas Court of Appeals held that the parole evidence could be admitted to raise a fact issue and reversed the trial court's decision. 

Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas in Sacks v. Haden ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. July 11, 2008), a per curium decision, reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's judgment.  

The issue was framed by the Court at the outset of the opinion:

The question in this case is whether a written attorney’s fee agreement that specifies only hourly fee rates may be modified by evidence of an oral capping agreement. We hold that it may not because parol evidence cannot modify a written agreement absent ambiguity. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

Here is the critical passage in the court's opinion:

The plain language of the engagement letter demonstrates that Haden agreed to pay Sacks an hourly fee, and that no cap on fees was set. Haden argues that a fee agreement must specifically state that hourly fees will accrue without limit in order for the agreement to be unambiguous and enforceable. But the lack of such explicit language is irrelevant if the agreement can be reasonably interpreted only one way.  We have never held that an open-ended hourly fee agreement will be enforced only if it expressly states there is no cap on fees, and we decline to do so now. If a contract is unambiguous, the parole evidence rule precludes consideration of evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements unless an exception to the parole evidence rule applies.

Hourly Rate In Engagement Letter Held Not To Be Ambiguous

        A client hired an attorney to represent him in a case.  The client signed an engagement letter to pay the attorney $200.00 per hour and further agreed to hourly billing rates for the attorney's staff.  The attorney and client negotiated a $10,000 retainer, later reduced the retainer, by agreement, to $5,000.   At the case's conclusion, attorney billed client for $35,304 after crediting the client the $5,000 retainer paid.   Client paid only $5,000 on the outstanding balance of the lawyers bills.

        After failing to collect all of his fees, the attorney sued  the client for nonpayment.  The client argued that because the written contract did not explicitly state whether the parties had agreed to an open account or a flat, maximum fee, the contract was ambiguous and therefore, a fact issue existed regarding the contract terms.  The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the attorney, but a Texas Court of Appeals held that the parole evidence could be admitted to raise a fact issue and reversed the trial court's decision. 

    Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas in Sacks v. Haden ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. July 11, 2008), a per curium decision, reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's judgment.  

    The issue was framed by the Court at the outset of the opinion:

       " The question in this case is whether a written attorney’s fee agreement that specifies only hourly fee rates may be modified by evidence of an oral capping agreement. We hold that it may not because parol evidence cannot modify a
written agreement absent ambiguity. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s judgment."

 Here is the critical passage in the court's opinion:

"The plain language of the engagement letter demonstrates that Haden agreed to pay Sacks an hourly fee, and that no cap on fees was set. Haden argues that a fee agreement must specifically state that hourly fees will accrue without limit in order for the agreement to be unambiguous and enforceable. But the lack of such explicit language is irrelevant if the agreement can be reasonably interpreted only one way.  We have never held that an open-ended hourly fee agreement will be enforced only if it expressly states there is no cap on fees, and we decline to do so now. If a contract is unambiguous, the parole evidence rule precludes consideration of evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements unless an exception to the parole evidence rule applies."

                                                JACK PIERCE