On Profitability of Alternative Fee Arrangements
A good anlaysis of the profitability of alternative fee arrangements:
A good anlaysis of the profitability of alternative fee arrangements:
By David McMahon & Jeevan Subbiah
This is a follow up in our series, How to Select New Counsel and Manage Legal Fees, related to litigation management for startup companies to help ease the frustration and confusion of hiring and managing legal counsel for the first time. As you may recall, previously we have discussed typical legal needs for a startup, tips for selecting an attorney, big and small firm size, and crowdfunding and The Jobs Act.
The initial stages of litigation management become important as you close in on hiring counsel. Early litigation management can include negotiating a billing rate appropriate for your legal needs, determining whether your work can be billed at an hourly or project rate, considering deferred billing and regularly reviewing your legal billing for inconsistencies and excessive charges. As we have noted earlier in this series, legal billing is changing drastically due to the challenging economy. Many common billing practices, such as billing clients for routine overhead costs, such as utilities, copy services, library maintenance and rent, are considered excessive. You may want to discuss these types of costs in advance with your lawyer. In addition, you should consider having your legal counsel managed either by a dedicated person internally or by a third party law firm.
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INTRODUCTION
I was recently speaking at a litigation management seminar and I was asked some questions regarding our method and protocol utilized in a qualitative legal audit or legal fee analysis.
The following is a basic outline of tips on how we conduct our analysis:
OUR METHOD OF REVIEW
During a fee analysis, we review the individualized legal and factual billing situation in detail and prepare supporting reports and charts (varying from one page summaries to detailed reports) to document our findings. We generally focus on the following key areas:
What if a client requests that the lawyer switch from being compensated by the hour to accepting a contingency fee instead? How would the lawyer avoid any conflicts, fulfill her duties of disclosure and avoid any other ethical violations to make that change, and how would this be done in a way to maximize its enforceability?
The American Bar Association (ABA) issued a new formal opinion (11-458, Changing Fee Arrangements During Representation, Aug. 4, 2011) which may help answer that question. 11-458 clarifies the circumstances wherein a lawyer may modify an existing fee agreement during the representation, or "change horses midstream."
Generally, modifications of fee arrangements are permissible under the Model Rules, but the lawyer must show any modification was (1) reasonable under the circumstances [ABA Model Rule 1.5(a), hereinafter "Rule"], (2) communicated and explained to the client [Rule 1.4 and 1.5(b)], and (3) accepted by the client.
Being a contract between two parties, fee arrangements are generally governed by simple rules of contract law. However, counsel has special burdens due to the lawyer's fiduciary duty to the client. Thus, any changes in the arrangement will be initially regarded as suspect, and lawyers are not free to change the existing relationship by only giving notice to the client. First and foremost, the new arrangement must be fair and reasonable for the client in light of the circumstances, under Rule 1.5(a).
Consequently, it is possible to change horses midstream, but the jump from one horse to the other should be done carefully, and with both eyes wide open.
In Cotchett, Pitre & MCarthy v. Universal Paragon Corp., 2010 DJDAR 13771 (2010) the California Court Of Appeal for the First Appellate District decided a unique fee case concerning a contingency fee award. The fee claim was based on the value of property received in settlement, as opposed to a cash resolution.
Universal Paragon Corp. (UPC) hired the law firm of Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy (CP&M) to represent the company in an environmental case. The parties entered into a unique contingency fee retainer agreement. The Agreement stipulated that if UPC received property rather than cash in settlement, CP&M would receive a 16 percent contingency payment, based on the value of the property. The payment was to be based on a combination of the last settlement offer and the value of the property received.
Settlement was ultimately reached in the litigation. The Agreement provided for an award of real property to UPC. CP&M then sent a letter to UPC claiming legal fees of over $19 million. The demand reflected 16 percent of the damages range set forth in the prior settlement statement, which was $86.5 to $155.7 million.
UPC contested the amount of the fee award and the parties agreed to arbitrate the controversy. The arbitrator awarded CP&M $7.5 million in attorney fees and expenses. The trial court confirmed the award, and UPC appealed, contending the fee award was unconscionable.
The court of appeal affirmed the grant of fees and that amount of the award. The court of appeal noted that Rule 4‑200 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits attorneys from entering into an agreement to charge an illegal or unconscionable fee. The court stated that a contractual term is unconscionable if, due to unequal bargaining power between the parties, the result of the contract is unfair.
The court concluded that the contingency fee arrangement was fair. It specifically found that UPC was a sophisticated party who employed outside counsel to negotiate the fee agreement with CP&M. The court found that UPC’s counsel was able to influence and negotiate the terms of the Agreement at arms length.
The Court also found the contingency fee awarded was not substantively unconscionable. The parties negotiated and agreed to base the contingency fee on the fair market value of the property received, which the arbitrator took into consideration in making the award.
The court concluded that the fee did not violate public policy.