Prevailing Defendant Entitled to Fee Award Unrelated To Claims Seeking Unpaid Wages

In Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection Inc., 2010 DJDAR 11569 (2010) the Third Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal decided an appeal challenging an award of attorneys fees to an employer who successfully defended against allegations of labor violations by two employees.

Anthony Kirby and Rich Leech (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Immoos Fire Protection Inc. The complaint alleged six causes of action for violations of various labor laws as well as unfair competition (Business & Professions Code §17200).

The trial court rejected the Plaintiffs’ motion for class action certification. The Plaintiffs then dismissed with prejudice their complaint as to all causes of action. The trial court awarded the Defendant attorney fees of $49,846.05 for its defense of three of the six causes of action, including Labor Code violations and the §17200 claims. The Plaintiffs appealed the decision awarding the Defendant attorneys fees.

The Court of Appeal noted that Labor Code § 218.5 provides for fee shifting in favor of the party that prevails on a claim for unpaid wages. The court noted, however, that § 218.5 does not allow employers to recover fees in any action for minimum or overtime wages.

The Plaintiffs’ complaint included causes of action involving failure to pay minimum wages as well as other, non‑wage claims. The court rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that a prevailing Defendant may not recover fees in a case that includes a claim for unpaid minimum or overtime wages. The court noted that attorney fees may still be awarded for unrelated claims subject to the fee‑shifting provisions of § 218.5.  

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s award of attorney fees for Immoos non‑wage related defense was proper. However, attorney fees awarded on two other causes of action was overruled as the award was miscalculated.

In "Bet the Farm" Cases, Court Calls for Close Scrutiny of Reasonableness

By David McMahon and Heather Lee

In Donahue v. Donahue, 182 Cal.App.4th 259 (Feb. 24, 2010), a California Court of Appeal recently reversed the trial court’s award of fees where simultaneous representation by multiple firms created unnecessary and duplicative fees.

The trial court charged a trust with approximately $5 million in past and ongoing attorneys fees incurred on behalf of a former trustee in defending against the beneficiary’s allegations of self-dealing and conflict of interest. Eight attorneys from three major law firms comprised the former trustee’s legal team, with four to five of those attorneys simultaneously appearing at the 14-day trial. 

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reversed the award and remanded, noting,

[u]nderstandably, these law firms brought with them their own supervising, support and administrative infrastructure, but simultaneous representation by multiple law firms posed substantial risks of task padding, over-conferencing, attorney stacking (multiple attendance by attorneys at the same functions), and excessive research.” Id.at 272.

The Donahue Court rejected the trustee’s “bet the farm” rationale for his litigation decision to simultaneously retain a legal team of seven to eight lawyers with primary activity and involvement from three major law firms, and his argument that he retained attorneys at two of those law firms to preserve “institutional memory.” Id. at 272-73.

Finding that this rationale resulted in overstaffing and duplication, the Court noted,

just as there can be too many cooks in a kitchen, there can be too many lawyers on a case.” Id. at 272 (quoting Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F.Supp.2d 91, 101 (D. Mass. 1998)). 

Similarly unavailing was the trustee’s argument that the additional attorneys served as “reserves” to cross examine witnesses at trial. Id.at 273.

In fact, the Court found that such a “spare-no-expense strategy” called for close scrutiny on questions of reasonableness, proportionality and trust benefit. Id. at 273. 

The Court pointed out that reasonableness depended not simply upon what fees were reasonably incurred in representing the defendant, but upon whether such fees were reasonably and prudently incurred for the trust. Id.at 274 (emphasis added). It aptly questioned,

Did [the respondent] demand a Rolls Royce defense when a prudent trustee could have arrived at the same destination in a Buick, Chrysler or Taurus?” Id.

Action Against Landlord Under The Unfair Competition Statute Cannot Support Attorney Fee Award

In City of Santa Monica v. Gabriel, 2010 DJDAR 11005 (2010), the Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal ruled that in an action brought pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the “UCL”), the trial court improperly granted a fee award. The appellate court reversed the award of attorney fees by the lower court, holding that the UCL does not in and of itself authorize the award of attorney fees.

The City of Santa Monica (“City”) filed a lawsuit against a landlord, who owned and leased units in the City. The complaint alleged that the landlord sexually harassed a tenant, improperly entered tenants’ units without notice and rented an uninhabitable space to a tenant as living quarters. The plaintiff asserted one cause of action under § 17200. Each of the alleged violations was premised on acts not in compliance with the Santa Monica Municipal Code (“SMMC”). The trial court ruled against the landlord, imposed a $7,500 civil penalty, enjoined him from contact with tenants, and ordered him to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. On appeal, the landlord argued that the UCL did not support an attorney fee award.

The court of appeal agreed with the landlord and reversed the fee award. 

The court reiterated the American rule, that in the absence of an express agreement or statute, each party involved in litigation must pay its own attorney fees. The court also noted that the UCL does not, by itself, authorize a court to award attorney fees. 

Plaintiff argued that attorney fees are recoverable when a borrowed statute, upon which a UCL claim is based, allows such recovery. Because the action was based on the municipal code, which provides that persons who violate the code are liable for attorney fees, the plaintiff argued that the fee award was proper. The court disagreed, noting that although the UCL borrows violations from other laws by making them actionable, there is no authority supporting the conclusion that the UCL borrows remedies from other statutes. 

The action was solely brought under the UCL, thus the fee award could not stand.

Please visit Barger & Wolen's Insurance Litigation & Regulatory Law Blog for more UCL case updates.

Award of Attorney Fees Under the Automobile Sale Finance Act Upheld by Court of Appeal

by David J. McMahon and Tino X. Do

In Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co., D054369 (July 15, 2010), the Fourth Appellate District upheld the trial court’s judgment awarding attorney fees to plaintiff class representative under the Automobile Sale Finance Act (“ASFA”), and denied costs to defendant in its claim under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 998.

Nelson involved a class action against the Pearson Ford car dealership for alleged violations of the ASFA, Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) arising from a backdated car sale contract that resulted in a car buyer paying interest for a time period when no contract existed, and for erroneously adding insurance premium to the sales price of the car which resulted in additional sales tax and financing charges. 

Two separate classes were certified by the trial court: the backdating class and the insurance class. 

Following a bench trial, the trial court found Pearson Ford liable under the ASFA to only the insurance class, liable to both classes under the UCL, and not liable to either class under the CLRA. The trial court granted certain remedies under the ASFA and the UCL, and awarded Nelson his attorney fees and costs under the ASFA. Both parties appealed. 

The appellate court reversed the trial court as to the portion of the judgment finding Pearson Ford not liable to the backdating class under the ASFA and the CLRA. The court also found that the trial court erred in the remedies it awarded under the ASFA and the UCL. The court upheld the trial court’s ruling on the award of attorney fees and costs.

Attorney fees in this matter were not awarded under the UCL, which does not permit this type of remedy, but under the AFSA, a statute that specifically grants the recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party. 

The appellate court noted that Pearson Ford did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that Nelson was the prevailing party for both classes under the ASFA (Civ. Code section 2983.4), or dispute the awarded amount. Instead, Pearson Ford argued that the trial court should have taken into consideration the fact that it had made a Section 998 offer of $500,000 before trial, and that Nelson failed to obtain a more favorable judgment at trial. 

The appellate court, while noting that a valid settlement offer can be made under Section 998 in a certified class action, agreed with the trial court that the Section 998 offer at issue was invalid because it was a lump-sum offer to two classes. The court stated that it would be impossible to determine whether either class received a less favorable result at trial than it would have received under the offer.

Limitations on Attorney Fees Under Probate Code Section 17211

In Soria v. Soria, 2010 DJDAR 8945 (2010), the Fourth Appellate District decided a case which demonstrates the limitations of Probate Code Section 17211(b). Probate Code Section 17211(b) permits a probate court to award attorney fees to the beneficiary of a trust who contests the trustees’ accounting, if the trustee opposes the contest without reasonable cause and in bad faith.

In 1993, Richard Soria Sr. (Father) and Irene Sarinana (Mother) entered into a contract with Father’s parents, Richard and Lynda Soria (Grandparents). The contract required the Grandparents to convey a deed to a parcel of real property to Richard and Irene Soria. However, the agreement contained a provision that if Richard and Irene Soria were to ever divorce; the property would immediately revert to Father and the couple’s children (Grandchildren).

The Grandparents allegedly did not comply with the terms of the agreement. In 2005, the Grandchildren filed suit against Grandparents in an effort to compel conveyance of the deed. The lawsuit alleged that the conditional contract to convey the deed to the property, constituted a trust agreement. The suit further alleged that the Grandparents were the trustees, and Mother, Father and Grandchildren were the beneficiaries of the contract. The proceedings at the trial level were complex. After vigorous motion practices a judgment was entered against the Grandparents finding that the agreement was an express trust, with Grandparents in breach of its terms for failing to turn over the property deed.

The judgment required the Grandparents to convey the property to the Grandchildren on certain payment terms. Subsequently, the trial court granted Grandchildren’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to Probate Code Section 17211(b), and Grandparents appealed that ruling.

The court of appeal reversed the judgment below.

The court stated that Section 17211(b) provides that if a beneficiary contests an accounting performed by the trustee, and the court determines that the trustee’s opposition to the proceeding was without reasonable cause and in bad faith, the court has authority to award costs, including reasonable attorney fees.

The court ruled that Section 17211(b) deals with the situation where a beneficiary’s contests a trustee’s accounting. Where that happens, the claim is governed by the probate court. Here, the Grandchildren did not contest a trustee’s accounting in probate court. The Grandchildren filed a civil complaint requesting injunctive relief and declaration that the agreement was in fact a trust. Therefore, the court concluded, Grandchildren were not entitled to attorney fees under Section 17211(b).

Attorney Fees Awards Subject to Offset Litigants' Preexisting Debts to the U.S. Government

 

In Astrue v. Ratliff, 2010 DJDAR 8875 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that attorney fees awards are properly payable to the litigant, not to her attorney. For this reason, a fee award is subject to an offset where the litigant owed the government a preexisting debt.

Ruby Ree (“Ree”) successfully sued the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) for benefits. Her attorney was Catherine Ratliff (“Ratliff”). Ree filed a successful motion for attorney fees which was not opposed by the government. Before the government reimbursed Plaintiff for the fee award, it discovered Ree owed the United States a debt that predated the award. The government sought an administrative offset against the award. Counsel for the prevailing party, Ms. Ratliff, intervened challenging the offset on the grounds that the fee award belonged to her, as a litigant’s attorney, and thus could not satisfy the litigant’s debts. The district court disagreed, but the appeals court agreed with Ratliff. The issue was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The high court reversed and remanded the decision of the court of appeal. 

The court specifically stated its longstanding view of the term “prevailing party.”  The court noted that in attorney fees statutes that term refers to the “prevailing litigant.” Statutes that mean to distinguish the attorney from the litigant in fees cases do so explicitly. The court also stated that the word “award” in the litigation context means giving or assigning by judicial decree. Here, the Equal Access to Justice Act provides for the court to “award” the “prevailing party” attorney fees. As such, an attorney fees award is payable to the litigant rather than to the attorney. Because the award is properly payable to the litigant it is subject to an offset for the preexisting debt.

 

Improper Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition Gives Rise to Award of Counsel Fees

In Orange Blossom Limited Partnership v. Southern California Sunbelt Developers Inc. 2010 DJDAR 8623, Ninth Circuit (2010), the Ninth Circuit concluded that a bankruptcy court properly awarded costs, attorney’s fees and punitive damages against thirteen creditors that initiated an improper involuntary bankruptcy petition under 11 U.S.C. § 303 (i).

The creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against IBT International Inc. (“IBT”) and Southern California Sunbelt Developers Inc. (“SCSD”) under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Two individuals, Donald Grammer and David Tedder, controlled the entities that filed the petitions. 

The bankruptcy court dismissed the petitions against SCSD after finding that the petitioners’ claims were the subject of a bona fide dispute. 11 U.S.C. §303(b). The court subsequently dismissed the involuntary petition against IBT on a motion by the petitioning creditors. 

SCSD and IBT filed motions for costs, attorneys’ fees and punitive damages against the petitioning creditors under § 303 (i). They also sought sanctions against the individuals who controlled the creditors under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and the court’s inherent power.

The court awarded IBT and SCSD costs, attorney fees and punitive damages under §303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code, and issued sanctions against Grammer and Tedder who then appealed.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part noting that §303(i) is a fee-shifting provision.

The court stated that the bankruptcy court may grant a debtor reasonable attorney fees when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is dismissed. The bankruptcy court awarded SCSD and IBT costs and fees incurred during the involuntary bankruptcy petition as well as those incurred while litigating claims for damages under §303(i). The Ninth Circuit concluded the award was appropriate, since a fee award can encompass all aspects of a §303 action, including claims for damages. 

The Ninth Circuit reversed on one issue noting that the bankruptcy court did not have authority to award costs against Grammer and Tedder for fees incurred by SCSD and IBT’s motions for sanctions. 

Creditors who are considering initiating an involuntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code should study this decision carefully.

 

Fees Incurred for Monitoring Settlement Agreement Compliance are Recoverable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988

In Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 DJDAR 8612 (9th Circuit 2010) the court decided whether, and to what extent the publisher of, a monthly prison news magazine may recover attorneys’ fees from the State of California for monitoring the State’s compliance with a prior settlement agreement.

The publisher Prison Legal News (“Legal News”) settled claims against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) relating to First and Fourth Amendment claims relating to dissemination of the magazine and other literature in correctional facilities. After entering into negotiations, the parties resolved the dispute and CDCR agreed to pay Legal News’ attorney fees for the period up until the agreement was executed by the parties. Legal News also reserved the right to pursue claims for attorney fees for work performed after signing the agreement. 

Subsequent to execution of the settlement agreement, Legal News filed a complaint against CDCR under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the procedures set out in the settlement agreement. The parties notified the district court of the settlement, sought dismissal without prejudice, and stipulated that Legal News was entitled to $320,000 in attorney fees for work done through December 11, 2006. The court granted dismissal and confirmed the attorney fee award. In October of 2007, Legal News moved for a further fee award in the sum of $137,672.79. The district court substantially granted that motion. The court awarded Legal News $137,502 in attorney fees for the period between September 1, 2007, and October 15, 2008. 

Subsequently, Legal News brought a second motion for fees in the sum of $143,322.96. The CDCR argued that Legal News was not entitled to additional fees for work performed in simply monitoring compliance with the settlement agreement.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part noting that § 1988 provides that in actions brought under § 1983, courts may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees. A plaintiff who obtains a legally enforceable settlement agreement qualifies as a prevailing party. The court stated that § 1988 authorizes attorney fees awards for monitoring compliance with the parties’ settlement agreement. This is true even where that monitoring does not lead to a judgment or order.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Legal News was entitled to recover attorney fees for monitoring the CDCR’s compliance.

Unsatisfied Judgment Allows Prevailing Party to Recover Attorney Fees

In Lucky United Properties Investment Inc. v. Lee, 2010 DJDAR 8085 (2010), the First District Court of Appeal decided a unique issue dealing with the recovery of attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment.

The procedural history of the case is convoluted. In 2006, the Plaintiff sued Lucky United Properties Investments Inc. (“Lucky”) for malicious prosecution. Lucky cross‑complained for malicious prosecution against the Plaintiff and his attorney, Albert Lee (hereinafter “Lee”). The trial court granted anti‑SLAPP motions in connection with both of the lawsuits.

Thereafter, the court awarded the attorney, Lee, $26,407.50 in fees and costs as the prevailing party on his anti‑SLAPP motion. Lucky failed to pay the attorney in a timely manner, and Lee filed a cost memorandum for $424 in enforcement costs. Lucky then sent the attorney $26,820, which the attorney claimed was insufficient. Lee then sought attorney fees and costs in relation to Lucky’s appeal from the order granting Lee’s anti‑SLAPP motion. Lee claimed $587 in costs from the appeal. The trial court awarded the attorney $33,830 for attorney fees and costs. The attorney then requested attorney fees incurred to enforce the earlier order awarding attorney fees and costs. The trial court denied the request on the ground that Lucky had fully paid the amounts due before the motion was brought.

The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the decision of the lower court, noting that a motion for attorney fees incurred in enforcing a judgment must be filed before a judgment is satisfied. Here, Lucky did not move to tax the $424 in costs claimed by the attorney. Thus, those costs were incorporated into the judgment and the $26,820 mailed to the attorney. The court noted that the amount did not satisfy the judgment. The court also noted that Lucky did not pay the original judgment in full despite the payment of $33,830. Thus, when the attorney filed the motion for attorney fees, Lucky had not fully satisfied the judgment. On that basis, the court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the attorney’s request for attorney fees.

"Prevailing Party" Status Not Necessary for an ERISA Attorneys' Fees Award

by Scott E. Calvert

Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., __ U.S.__ (2010)

In a decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the United States Supreme Court has declared that an ERISA claimant need not be a “prevailing party” to be eligible for an attorneys’ fees award. In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., __ U.S.__ (2010), the Court ruled that under 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1), a party may be awarded attorneys’ fees if “some degree of success on the merits” is achieved, as opposed to the more stringent requirement imposed by some circuit courts that they be a “prevailing party.”

 

Bridget Hardt initiated the litigation seeking long-term disability benefits under an ERISA plan. Faced with cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Reliance’s motion finding that “Reliance’s decision to deny benefits was based on incomplete information.” The District Court also denied Hardt’s motion for summary judgment, but in doing so, found “compelling evidence” that Hardt was totally disabled. The District Court accordingly remanded the claim to Reliance with instructions that all of the evidence in the file be adequately considered within 30 days, otherwise “judgment will be issued in favor of Ms. Hardt.” 

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Non-Taxable Costs May Be Awarded Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act

In Grove v. Wells Fargo Financial California Inc., 2010 DJDAR 7351 (2010), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided an interesting case involving the types of costs which are recoverable under the provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Under FCRA § 16810(a)(2), the statute permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover the “costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.”

The facts of the case are summarized as follows. Wells Fargo Financial California Inc. (“Wells Fargo”) notified several credit agencies that the plaintiff was delinquent on an automobile loan. The plaintiff disputed the information and requested that Wells Fargo correct the record. Wells Fargo refused to do so. Plaintiff then sued Wells Fargo under the FCRA.

In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that Wells Fargo provided false information to the credit reporting agencies. The parties subsequently reached a settlement, and the district court approved the parties’ stipulated judgment. The agreement provided that Wells Fargo would pay plaintiff $20,000 plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. In plaintiff’s motion to recover on the judgment, plaintiff also requested $6,770.60 in non‑taxable costs, in addition to other expenses. The district court denied plaintiff’s request for costs that were not listed as “taxable” under 28 U.S.C. section 1929, concluding it did not have any authority to award non‑taxable costs. Plaintiff appealed that decision of the lower court to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, noting that 28 USC section 1920 outlines the federal court’s power to shift litigation costs. The court noted, however, that Section 1920 does not speak to the authority of the district court to award taxable costs. For that reason, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the FCRA’s expense shifting provision authorized the award of non-taxable costs. The court concluded that the statute does contemplate such an award.

The Court noted that the FCRA allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees. The court determined that since the FCRA provides for the recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees,” district courts have discretion to award non‑taxable costs to prevailing parties under the FCRA. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in ruling that it had no authority to do so.

Interest Incurred on Borrowed Funds to Secure an Undertaking is Not Recoverable

In Rossa v. D.L. Falk Construction Inc., 2010 DJDAR 6674 (May 6, 2010), a panel from the First Appellate District decided a novel case interpreting what constitutes a recoverable cost of appeal under the California Rules of Court (hereinafter “CRC”). 

The plaintiffs were awarded $100,000 on a breach of contract claim against D.L. Falk Construction Inc. (Falk). The trial court added to the jury verdict approximately $680,000 in expenses, expert fees, and attorney fees. The Defendant appealed only from the award and the appellate court reversed. The court held that the court’s fee award of fees constituted an abuse of discretion because it was not supported by an appropriate explanation from the trial judge. Falk was awarded its costs on appeal.

On remand, Falk sought to recover the costs and expenses necessary to secure the appeal bond, including $99,289.81 for interest expenses incurred for the posting of an undertaking. The plaintiffs moved to strike the interest component. Plaintiffs argued that the interest was not reimbursable under 8.278 of the CRC. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the expenses. The court ruled that interest incurred on sums borrowed to obtain a letter of credit was not subject to reimbursement under the CRCs. Falk then appealed.

The court of appeal affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court stated that CRC section 8.278(d)(1)(F) specifies the recoverable costs of appeal include the cost to purchase a bond. The court noted that these costs include the premium and cost to obtain a letter of credit as collateral.

However, the court concluded that interest paid on sums borrowed to fund a letter of credit used to obtain the undertaking are not within the ambit of the CRC’s. The interest expense Falk attempted to recover was in connection with a letter of credit, which may be recovered under different provisions of the CRC. The court however, refused to extend interest reimbursement allowable to deposits to apply to bond interest. The appellate court concluded that Falk’s attempts to recover these interest expenses were properly denied.

US Supreme Court Limits Fee Enhancements to "Exceptional Cases"

In a much anticipated legal fee decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on April 21, 2010, that trial courts may award fee enhancements above the “lodestar” amount to lawyers for superior performance, but only in rare and well-documented circumstances

The case of Perdue v. Kenny A. was one which had been carefully watched by civil rights and public interest groups, many of which rely on fee-shifting statutes when they prevail in litigation. 

The Supreme Court’s 5-4 majority rejected the fee enhancement request of $6 million by plaintiffs’ lawyers in a successful class-action suit on behalf of 3,000 children in Georgia, which the court recognized had helped reform the Georgia foster care system.

The trial judge awarded the lawyers $6 million using the lodestar method of calculating legal fees — hours worked multiplied by the local hourly market rate for lawyers of comparable experience and skill. The judge then added an “enhancement” of $4.5 million for what he said was work of exceptionally high quality.

Justice Alito, writing for the majority, said fee enhancements for superior attorney performance are permissible, but only in exceptional cases. In this case, however, he believed that the trial judge did not provide “proper justification” for the enhancement under a series of factors listed in the opinion. 

Justice Alito made it clear that the purpose of fee enhancements was not to enrich the lawyers.  He said that federal fee-shifting law,

... serves an important public purpose by making it possible for persons without means to bring suit to vindicate their rights.  But unjustified enhancements that serve only to enrich attorneys are not consistent with the statute’s aim. 

In a footnote, Alito added that if the $4.5 million fee enhancement that was awarded by the trial judge had remained in place, the attorneys representing the foster care plaintiffs “…would earn as much as the attorneys at some of the richest law firms in the country.” 

In conclusion, the 5-4 majority opinion overturned the trial court’s award of a $4.5 million lodestar enhancement to plaintiffs’ attorneys and remanded the case back to the district court.

Private Attorney General Fees are Only Available in an Action Against the Opposing Party

By: David J. McMahon and Brendan V. Mullan

In McGuigan v. City of San Diego, 2010 DJDAR 5078 (2010), the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District rendered a decision in a unique private attorney general case under the provisions of C.C.P. § 1021.5.

A retired employee of the City of San Diego (San Diego) brought an action as a representative plaintiff for a class of similarly situated employees. The lawsuit was brought against San Diego alleging that the City seriously underfunded its retirement plans. The parties settled the lawsuit. The settlement agreement required the class representative to act in a similar capacity in further proceedings. After the settlement agreement was signed, there were extensive court hearings and several challenges raised to the settlement. 

The trial court concluded that the objections submitted had been adequately addressed, and approved the settlement and issued judgment. The settlement agreement included an award of attorney fees to class counsel pursuant to C.C.P. § 1021.5 which the court approved. San Diego subsequently was ordered to pay $1.6 million in attorney fees.

The settlement objectors appealed the court’s ruling approving the settlement. Following successful defense of the settlement on this appeal, the class representative motioned for additional attorney fees from San Diego. The trial court denied the motion. The court stated that C.C.P. § 1021.5 allows a fee award only against an “opposing” party. The court found that on appeal, McGuigan and San Diego were not opposing parties. The class representative appealed that ruling.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that C.C.P. § 1021.5 permits a trial court, in its discretion, to award private attorney fees to a successful party in any appropriate action against only an opposing party. The settlement agreement entered into by San Diego and McGuigan, and the subsequent judgment, altered the parties’ relationship in the litigation. As a settling party and fellow respondent to the third party’s appeal, San Diego was not an “opposing party” to McGuigan, as they were all allied in interest in defending the settlement. 

Therefore, McGuigan was not entitled to attorney fees from the City under C.C.P. § 1021.5.

Discretion to Deny Costs and Attorney Fees to FEHA Plaintiffs Rests with the Trial Courts

In a recent California Supreme Court decision, the court determined that trial courts have the discretion to deny costs and attorney fees to a plaintiff alleging violations of the FEHA who recovers damages that could have been recovered in a limited civil case

By: David J. McMahon and Brendan V. Mullan

 In Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970 (2010), the California Supreme Court was presented with yet another claim brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) in which the plaintiff’s attorney requested fees far in excess of the minimal damages recovered by the plaintiff. The issue before the court was whether C.C.P. section 1033(a) gives courts the discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing party under the FEHA when the judgment is less than the jurisdictional amount of limited civil cases ($25,000 or less).

In Chavez, the plaintiff was a police officer who sued the city of Los Angeles alleging claims of employment discrimination, harassment and unlawful retaliation in violation of the FEHA; defamation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; invasion of privacy; civil rights violations; trespass, inverse condemnation; nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

After seven years of convoluted litigation in state and federal court, the plaintiff prevailed on one claim, retaliation, and received a judgment in the amount of $11,500. Plaintiff’s other causes of action were all dismissed or found without merit. 

After the jury returned its verdict, the plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion for attorney fees under Government Code section 12965(b) for $436,602.75. Two months later, the attorney filed an amended motion for attorney fees, adding a “2x” multiplier to the lodestar calculation, increasing the amount of fees requested to a total of $870,935.50. 

Defendants opposed the motion asserting that the plaintiff’s attorney had overreached and outrageously inflated the fee request.

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Court Decides Novel Issue Concerning Priority of a Contractual Lien for Legal Services

In Pou Chen Corp. v. MTS Products, 2010 DJDAR 4577 (March 26, 2010), the California Court of Appeal, 2nd District, decided a novel issue concerning the priority of a contractual lien for legal services.

Background

GBMI entered into a contract with MTS whereby GBMI would buy products that MTS intended to sell to Wal‑Mart. Subsequently, the parties negotiated and entered into as a joint venture and formed a new entity named BHE. A third entity, Pou Chen Corp., contributed $10 million for purchase of a 70 percent interest in the new entity, BHE. MTS began withholding payments from BHE due to a business dispute. BHE and GBMI sued MTS to recover the withheld funds. At trial, the jury awarded BHE and GBMI $46,485,578 and awarded MTS $11,476,877 against Pou Chen on its cross‑complaint.

Subsequently, two law firms entered into a joint retainer agreement with MTS to collect MTS’s judgment against Pou Chen. 

The law firms negotiated a contractual lien on any recovery obtained against Pou Chen. Later, BHE and GBMI obtained a writ of execution and levied on MTS’s bank accounts, resulting in payment to BHE and GBMI of $24,813,458. Thus, approximately $23,643,689 was unpaid on the BHE judgment. BHE and GBMI then assigned the unpaid judgment to Pou Chen for $100,000 and Pou Chen moved to offset the judgments.

MTS briefed the issue, arguing that the lawyers had contractual liens that were senior to Pou Chen’s right to offset the judgment. Nonetheless, the trial court granted Pou Chen’s offset motion. The result was that Pou Chen had a remaining judgment against MTS of $11,249,864.

MTS pursued an appeal of the trial court’s ruling and the Court of Appeal affirmed, stating: 

The offset of a judgment against judgment is a matter of right absent the existence of facts establishing competing equities.

The Court of Appeal stated that an attorney’s lien is superior to any right to offset judgments obtained in independent actions. 

The court noted, however, that the lien is subordinate to an adverse party’s right to offset judgments in the same action or in an action based on the same transaction. In this case, the BHE and GBMI judgment obtained by Pou Chen related to the same transaction as the MTS judgment. The court entered the judgment at the same time and in the same action as the MTS judgment. 

The law firms’ contractual liens were thus subordinate to Pou Chen’s right to offset the judgment.

Attorneys Fee Provision in California Disabled Persons Act Is Not Preempted by the ADA

In Jankey v. Song Koo Lee, 2010 DJDAR 2024 (2010), the California First Appellate District decided an unsettled question relating to the scope of preemption of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12101 (ADA). The court reviewed the preemption question vis-à-vis California Civil Code §54, known as the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA).

The plaintiff was a disabled person who used a wheelchair. The plaintiff sued the owner of a food market, seeking injunctive relief under the ADA and the CDPA. The plaintiff claimed that a step at the entry of the market was a barrier, that effectively prevented him from entering the store. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment.

As a prevailing party, the defendant moved for attorney fees under Civil Code Section 55 contained in the CDPA. Based on the case authority of Hubbard v. SoBreck LLC, 531 F3d. 983 (9th Cir. 2008), the plaintiff argued that the ADA preempted fee awards to prevailing defendants under Section 55 unless there is affirmative proof that the plaintiff’s action was “groundless.” The court disagreed and granted the defendant fees amounting to $118,458.

The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court noted that the federal law preempts state law when state law is an actual conflict with federal law. The court concluded that Section 55 of the CDPA mandated that a prevailing party in an action to enjoin a violation of disability access requirements is entitled to recover attorney fees.

The court noted that the ADA’s preemption provision’s purpose is to maximize the plaintiff’s options in pursuing state law remedies. Further, it found that a conflict does not exist between the discretionary fee provision of the ADA and mandatory nature of fees under Section 55. Accordingly, the ADA did not preempt Section 55 and the trial court properly awarded the defendant reasonable attorney fees.

Plaintiffs Fail To Satisfy the "Prevailing Party" Standard

Where a Settlement Offset Exceeds the Amount Awarded at Trial

In Goodman v. Lozano, 2010 DJMAR 1925, (2010), the California Supreme Court decided an important case under CCP § 1032, the prevailing party statute. 

Background

The plaintiffs entered into a contract to purchase a house from the Lozano defendants. AMPM Construction built the house. Shortly thereafter the plaintiffs sued the Lozanos, Albert Mobrici, a principal with AMPM, AMPM, the architect, and the real estate brokers for construction defects. After protracted litigation, the builder and its principal settled with the plaintiffs for $200,000. Other defendants, except for the Lozanos, settled with the plaintiffs for approximately $30,000. The plaintiffs rejected the Lozanos’ $35,000 settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure Section 998. The case went to trial and the court awarded the plaintiffs $146,000 against the Lozanos. However, the prior settlements totaled $230,000. 

The trial court concluded that the Lozanos should receive credit for the prior settlement and that the plaintiffs should receive nothing. Because the Lozanos paid nothing towards any judgment, the court found that they were prevailing parties. The court awarded the Lozanos $132,000 in attorney fees and $12,000 in costs. The appeals court affirmed that result.

The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The Court noted that where a plaintiff settles with defendants for an amount that is greater than a subsequent damage award against a nonsettling defendant, the damage award is essentially nullified and results in a zero judgment.  

The Court stated that prevailing party is entitled to recover costs in any action and is defined as “the party with a net monetary recovery.” The Court held that a plaintiff who obtains a verdict against a defendant, which is offset to zero due to prior settlements, has not gained a “net monetary recovery.” Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiffs were not the prevailing parties. The Lozanos prevailed because they avoided payment to the plaintiffs by proving damages in an amount less than the settlement proceeds.

For these reasons the Court concluded that the Lozanos were entitled to their reasonable attorney fees and costs awarded at trial.

Municipal Ordinance Permits Attorney Fee Award Only In Limited Proceedings

In Woodland Part Management LLC v. City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board, 2010 DJDAR 1801 (2010) the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate district decided a unique fee case arising under the City of Palo Alto’s Rent Stabilization and Control Ordinance (hereinafter “the Ordinance”).

Woodland Part Management LLC (Woodland) was a real property management company. Woodland managed rental properties in the City of East Palo Alto. Rental properties in that city are regulated by a rent stabilization Ordinance. 

In 2008, Woodland petitioned for a writ of mandate against the City. Pursuant to the writ, Woodland alleged that the City had improperly increased a landlord registration fee assessed under the Ordinance. Woodland claimed that the City improperly raised the fee to $240 from $135 per unit. Woodland tendered payment at the old rate but the City refused to accept the funds. The superior court granted Woodland’s petition and ordered the City to process Woodland’s payments at the reduced rates. Woodland then moved for attorney fees based on § 15.A.5 of the Ordinance. The City argued that § 15.A.5 only authorized attorney fee awards in actions between landlords and tenants. The lower court disagreed and awarded Woodland $20,037.00 in attorney fees. 

The court reversed the fee award. The court noted that under § 15.A.5 of the Ordinance, a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees “in any civil proceeding that a landlord or tenant initiates to enforce his/her rights under this Ordinance.” Woodland argued that it was acting in the capacity of a landlord when it initiated the action under the Ordinance. In response, the City argued that § 15.A.5 applies only to proceedings between a landlord and a tenant to enforce rights under the Ordinance. The court agreed with the City holding that § 15.A.5 authorized the recovery of attorney fees only in proceedings between landlords and tenants. 

Because the litigation did not involve an action between a landlord and a tenant, the court concluded that the trial court erred in awarding Woodland attorney fees.

Ninth Circuit Overturns Attorney Fee Award Against the Government

Court finds that the government did not act frivolously in conducting a factual investigation

In U.S.. v. Capener, 2010 DJDAR 392 (2010) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overturned a fee award, rendered against the government under the so called “Hyde Amendment.” 

The Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note, permits the court to award attorneys fees to a defendant in a criminal prosecution where the government has acted in a manner that was “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith . . .”  

After conducting an investigation initiated by a health insurance carrier, the federal government prosecuted physician Mark Capener for alleged health care fraud. The government claimed that its investigation found indications that the doctor had billed patients for unnecessary and unperformed surgeries.

As a result of the investigation, the doctor was charged with numerous counts of fraud. The government relied on statements made by its retained expert. The expert concluded that certain pathology samples did not contain bone fragments, which would be present if certain surgeries were in fact performed. Further investigation revealed that the samples actually did contain bone fragments. At trial, the government presented the bone fragment theory to support the prosecution. 

After further proceedings, the charges against Capener were dismissed by the government and Capener moved to recover his fees under the Hyde Amendment. The district court found that portions of the government’s claims were frivolous, and awarded partial fees. Both the government and the defendant appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. 

The court noted that under the Hyde Amendment, the court may award a prevailing party reasonable attorney fees where it finds that the government’s position violated the standards set forth in the Hyde Amendment. The Ninth Circuit stated that a failure to sufficiently investigate can rise to the level of frivolousness only when the government had some reason to know further investigation was needed. The court concluded that there were no facts in the record to support a conclusion that the government knew the “bone fragment theory” was wrong. 

On this basis the court concluded that the government’s reliance on its expert’s opinion did not rise to the level of misconduct necessary to recover fees under the Hyde Amendment.

Financial Abuse of Elders and the Recovery of Attorneys' Fees

By Jennifer N. Lee

Financial elder abuse claims are on the rise in California.[1] Companies engaging in financial transactions with people over the age of 65, like insurance or financial services companies that sell products to elders, are increasingly targets of the plaintiff’s bar.

This is largely due to the fact that the California Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA) includes a mandatory provision for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs; if the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not to be true) that the defendant committed financial elder abuse, the court must award attorneys’ fees.[2] This fee-shifting provision is unilateral; a prevailing defendant may not recover attorneys’ fees. Wood v. Santa Monica Escrow Company, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1186 (2007).

While the ability to recover attorneys’ fees is clear, in some instances, the amount of fees that may reasonably be awarded is not. First, the there is no provision in the EADACPA that provides guidance on the reasonableness of attorneys fees in cases involving financial elder abuse claims. Welfare & Institutions Code sec. 15657.1 does set forth factors to provide guidance on attorneys fees awards:

  • The value of the abuse-related litigation in terms of the quality of life of the elder or dependent adult, and the results obtained;
  • Whether the defendant took reasonable and timely steps to determine the likelihood and the extent of liability; and
  • The reasonableness and timeliness of any written offer in compromise made by a party to the action.

Unfortunately, these factors do not expressly apply to financial elder abuse claims; they expressly apply only to claims involving physical abuse and neglect. The absence of an analogous provision for financial elder abuse appears to be a legislative oversight, since the same types of awards (e.g., attorney fees, punitive damages, etc...) are recoverable for both types of elder abuse claims.

For the time being though, until the Legislature corrects its oversight, plaintiffs’ attorneys prosecuting financial elder abuse claims may continue to argue that their fee claims need not be subject to scrutiny against these factors.

Plaintiffs may even seek an enhancement of attorneys fees, by relying on Civil Code Sec. 3345. This statute allows for trebling to redress unfair or deceptive practices committed against an elder where a statute imposes a fine, penalty or remedy whose purpose or effect is to punish or deter.

Plaintiffs have argued in favor of treble attorneys fees, asserting that the attorneys’ fees provisions of the EADACPA are statutes intended to redress unfair practices committed against an elder and that the purpose of those fee-shifting provisions is to punish or deter further wrongful conduct.

Allowing the recovery of treble attorneys’ fees is problematic. For one, it would violate standards of professionalism prohibiting attorneys from being compensated for work not done or receiving unearned fees. Unfortunately, neither the EADACPA nor sec. 3345 provides any guidance on this issue.

Compounding the lack of statutory guidance, little case law exists to better define the parameters for attorney fee recoveries by plaintiffs. 

Only one case to date discusses the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees for a prevailing plaintiff who successfully asserted a financial elder abuse claim. In In re Levitt, 93 Cal. App. 4th 544 (2002), the Second Appellate District opined that the size of the estate at issue may be a factor in determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees sought. 

In Levitt, a prominent attorney, who was the drafter of the EADACPA, represented a somewhat modest estate to prosecute a financial elder abuse claim and prevailed. He, along with co-counsel, sought attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $127,000 on an estate valued at $370,000. The court reduced the sought-for amount to $110,000, not because of the quality of work done, the amount of time spent or the result obtained, but rather because of the sheer size of the estate in relation to the fees incurred.

The bottom line is that while the EADACPA makes the recovery of attorney fees and costs mandatory, it provides little guidance as what fees may be reasonably recovered. Until further legislative guidance is provided, counsel defending financial elder abuse claims should apply all measures of reasonableness provided for under the rules of professional conduct, the reasonableness factors set forth in the EADACPA for attorneys fees in physical abuse and neglect claims, case law and accepted practices for attorney fee billing to reduce any mandatory attorneys’ fees claims.


[1] "Financial abuse" of elders is defined as the assisting with or taking, secreting, appropriating or retaining of real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code sec. 15657.5. By statute, “wrongful use” is imputed if the person or entity knew or should have known that the conduct was likely to be harmful to the elder. With such low and vague pleading standards and because little case law defines “for wrongful use,” an institutional client that engaged in a legitimate business transaction with an elder could be sued for financial elder abuse by a disgruntled beneficiary or a conservator of the estate who disagrees with the suitability of the transaction.

[2] It should be noted that the burden of proof to recover attorneys’ fees is lower than the clear and convincing evidence required to recover punitive damages.

 

Improper Claim Brought by Trust Beneficiaries Can be Remedied Through an Attorney Fee Award Rendered Under the Equitable Power of the Probate Court

 In Rudnick v. Rudnick, 2009 DJDAR 16944 (2009) the Fifth Appellate District decided a novel case involving an attorney fee award in the probate context. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision granting fees and deducting them from future distributions to certain minority beneficiaries who maintained litigation against a trust in bad faith.

Philip Rudnick, Robert Rudnick, and Milton Rudnick (“Beneficiaries”) were beneficiaries of a Trust. Oscar Rudnick (“Trustee”) was the trustee. The majority of the trust beneficiaries approved the sale of the trust’s principal asset, a large acreage piece of real property. The Trustee petitioned the probate court requesting approval of both the sale and the proposed distribution. The Beneficiaries, who held a minority interest, opposed the petition.

After hearings, the probate court came to the conclusion that the opposition submitted by the Beneficiaries was submitted in bad faith and was solely designed to delay distribution of the sale proceeds. The court awarded approximately $226,000 in attorney fees and costs to the trustee and ordered that the fees were to be deducted against the Beneficiaries future trust distributions. The Beneficiaries then appealed.

The court of appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial court noting that the probate court had the equitable power to make the disputed award. The court distinguished between an award of fees rendered pursuant to the supervisory powers of the court versus the broad equitable powers that a probate court maintains over trusts within its jurisdiction. The court noted that attorneys hired by a trustee to aid the trust are entitled to reasonable fees paid from the trust assets. The issue was whether the burden was improperly shifted to the appellants’ share of the estate. The court found that it was not.

The probate court charged the attorney fees to the appellants’ future trust distributions.  The court of appeal agreed with the result noting that it would be unfair to burden the majority beneficiaries with the payment of the fees that were incurred in responding to the appellants’ bad faith tactics in filing a meritless opposition.